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The New Public Security Model for Mexico. By Genaro García Luna. Mexico: Litoprocess, 2011. Pp. 136. \$???.?

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In his book, *The New Public Security Model for Mexico*, Genaro García Luna, Mexico's former Secretary of Public Security, describes the policies implemented by the Calderón Administration through 2011 as it addressed the public security shortcomings that have plagued the country during the past fifteen years. In his exposition of these policies, García Luna discusses the Mexican government's historical inability to authoritatively and effectively act against and respond to serious crime. According to García Luna, these deficiencies were due to the state's failure to maintain an adequately resourced, trained, organized, and trustworthy police force. Without a reliable and effective police force, organized criminals, especially those associated with drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), took advantage of the resulting failure of the state to enact social control and successfully engaged in increasingly serious crimes. Consequently, the Calderón Administration systematically overhauled the entire public security model in order to provide the 'Mexican Government with the legitimacy and authority required to fight criminality and provide public security' (p. 29). Most helpfully, García Luna notes the various policy implementations and describes why they have been enacted and how they ought to work over time.

Nonetheless, the book has notable deficiencies. First, it understates the role of the state in controlling serious crime and in regime liberalization during the PRI's hegemony. Though García Luna states that 'there were no political incentives or criminal phenomena that would necessitate development of the investigative or intelligence capacities of the country's police forces' (18), his historical review of organized and serious crime in Mexico fails to convey an understanding of Lupsha's (1991) findings that organized criminal groups engaged in pervasive corruption tactics since at least the 1960s. Moreover, Lupsha argues that organized criminal groups developed a symbiotic relationship with government officials whereby traffickers assisted the police in exchange for protection and advance warning of police action. In addition, García Luna overlooks the findings of Snyder and Durán Martínez (2009) who demonstrate that the breakdown of the state-sponsored protection rackets, which occurred as the lower levels of government became run by opposition parties, led to the liberalization of the illicit markets. Consequently, DTOs now directly compete against the state by contesting the state's monopoly of violence.

As a result of these historical oversights, García Luna fails to emphasize the long-term and systemic problems that undermine the credibility the Mexican government. Although García Luna rightly states that '[t]he role played by the citizenry in preventing and reporting crimes in their communities is essential to crime fighting' (p. 108), he fails to show how the New Public Security Model can

assuage the public's longstanding mistrust of the police. As Sabet (2012) notes, the citizenry remains wary of the police, notorious for ineffective and corrupt officers who cannot be disciplined due to the difficulty of lodging and trying a complaint against an officer. As a result, in spite of the improved vetting that the police are subjected to, the citizenry still harbours mistrust towards the government and its law enforcement bodies. A notable example involves García Luna himself, who was implicated in 2012 by a captured trafficker, Édgar 'La Barbie' Valdez Villarreal, of being on DTO payrolls since 2002. By failing to explicitly consider the on-going problems of trust between the government and its citizenry and how policy might be enacted to ameliorate the current levels of distrust, the reader must remain wary about the possible effectiveness of the New Public Security Model, irrespective of how well planned and executed its policies are.

Finally, it would be helpful to understand what policy gaps still remain in light of the parameters and limitations of the New Public Security Model. For example, although García Luna identifies the necessity of a multi-national solution to combat widespread organized crime and lists a few of the agreed to pacts and their reasons for existing, he only briefly touches upon their implications and offers little by way of detailing to what extent these agreements improve information sharing between Mexico and other countries. Moreover, García Luna does not provide insight on the continuing difficulties inadequately addressed by the discussed policy changes such as the continued flow of weapons from the US to Mexico or the actions of non-Mexican criminal actors.

In spite of the book's shortcomings, García Luna presents the component policies of *The New Public Security Model for Mexico* in an easily accessible and comprehensive manner which provides a checklist which future researchers can use to assess the model's success over time. If Mexico, with the help of its neighbouring countries, is to curb the serious crime problems that plague it, the policies presented in this book must be understood, monitored, and improved upon over time.

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